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D'Amato: The Moral Dilemma of Positivism

THE MORAL DILEMMA OF POSITIVISM*
ANTHONY D'AMATO**

Not only do positivists insist upon separating law from morality,
but they also appear to be unable to deal with moral questions raised
by law once the two are separated. This inability stems, I believe, from
their simultaneous attempt to assert and to prove that law and morality
are separate; the argument reduces to a vicious circle. Neil MacCormick's lectures, "A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law?" which I
have been asked to comment upon, exemplifies this problem. To Professor MacCormick's credit, he has attempted to lay an explicit moral
foundation for the adoption of the amoralistic positivist conception of
law, something which other positivists have avoided or - in H.L.A.
Hart's case - let fall implicitly between two books, one addressed to
positivism and the other to morality.' Professor MacCormick's grace
of style and wit tend to mask the inconsistency upon which his argument
is erected, and yet at the same time make it a pleasurable task for his
readers, including me, to examine that argument with care.
The inconsistency upon which Professor MacCormick builds his
argument lies in his critique of the natural-law approach which requires,
as he puts it, a two-step procedure for determining whether a given
rule is to count as "law." For ease of reference and to generalize the
argument as much as possible, I call these two tests the "pedigree"
and the "content" tests,2 and I believe that Professor MacCormick would
have no objection to these labels. The tests are:
1. The Pedigree Test. What Professor MacCormick calls an "institutional fact" analysis is applied to a given rule, to see whether it has
in fact been generated by the constitutional processes of the legal system in question.
2. The Content Test. What Professor MacCormick calls a test of
"moral justifiability" is then applied to the rule. Such a test calls for
an examination of the content of the rule, judging whether it is compatible with morality. (I omit for the moment, because Professor
MacCormick omits it also, the question whether the morality referred
to is general morality or the morality of the person making the "test.")
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These are the two tests for legal validity according to Professor
MacCormick's view of natural law; that is, under natural-lawtheory as
he views it, a rule would have to pass both tests to count as law. (Again,
I put to one side a possible objection to the effect that at least some
versions of natural-law theory might not insist upon the rule passing
the pedigree test if it passes the content test. For instance, a rule of
custom that comes up for the very first time in a contested case might
be argued by the naturalist to be a valid rule of law that should determine the result in the case, as Lord Mansfield might have viewed the
matter in connection with the law merchant. A positivist, on the other
hand, holding that the rule cannot be a rule of law because it fails the
pedigree test, would have a much harder time arguing the case on behalf
of the party asserting the customary rule. But for present purposes,
taking Professor MacCormick's thesis in the light most favorable to
him, I put aside this rather important objection to his characterization
of naturalism.)
Now we come to the inconsistency. Professor MacCormick quotes
with approval a passage from H.L.A. Hart, which he says constitutes
a "powerful case" for the positivist position "on purely practical and
3
moral grounds:"
What surely is most needed in order to make men clear
sighted in confronting the official abuse of power, is that
they should preserve the sense that the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of
obedience, and that, however great the aura of majesty or
authority which the official system may have, its demands
4
must in the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny.
In this passage, Hart uses the term "legally valid" in the positivist
sense, namely, a rule that has passed the pedigree test alone. How, then,
can this passage constitute an objection to the naturalist viewpoint as defined by Professor MacCormick himself - which requires that
the rule must also pass the content test before it can be determined to
have legal validity? What Professor MacCormick has done is to use the
passage from Hart to refute the naturalist contention that there should
be a content test in addition to a pedigree test, but in so doing contradicts himself by adopting Hart's use of the term "legally valid" on the
basis of the pedigree test alone.

3.
11 (1985).
4.
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Professor MacCormick is not alone in making this fatally inconsistent attack upon naturalism. Hart's book, The Concept of Law, contains a curious nine-page section which either denies Hart's own thesis
that moral obligation cannot be derived from positive law or simultaneously adopts and refutes the naturalists' content test. 5 This form of
reasoning in a circle whenever positivists confront the question of moral
obligation to law is what I have labelled the moral dilemma of positivism.
But even wholly circular arguments sometimes do not go away.
They remain because of psychological as distinct from logical reasons.
Consider the postivist who confronts the moral reality of law after
looking at law as an abstract logical entailment derived from constitutional processes. Having completed during the day his analysis showing that a complete test of legal validity is the content-free pedigree
test, he awakes suddenly at night realizing that his conception may
lead to the worst kinds of official abuses of power. Any dictator's commands are "law" because the dictator is the constitutionally valid legal
authority. Once labelled "law," the dictator's commands tend to be
obeyed by a public that believes in labels. The public invests some
amount of moral obligatoriness in the dictator's decree because it is
"the law" even if the decree, in terms of its content, is immoral. We
know this happened in Nazi Germany and it continues to happen in
dictatorial regimes today.
What can the positivist do about this nightmare? Reexamining
the premises of his own theory would compound it. Rather, he must
embark upon an ambitious program of changing reality to suit his theory. He must teach the public to erase from its mind any notion that a
law carries with it a sense of obligation. Thus he begins by lecturing
to law students, then writes articles, and finally publishes books aimed
at a larger audience, exhorting his readers to renounce their unenlightened psychological attitudes. He urges them to a draw a sharp line
between law and morality. Professor MacCormick adds a refinement
of his own to this process: he insists that drawing the sharp line is
morally compulsory.
This process reminds me of the story of a director who, during
rehearsals, asked the playwright to change a line of the script on the
ground that audiences would be confused and sidetracked by the line
as written. The playwright responded, "if the audience doesn't like it
the way I've written it, why don't you change the audience?" So too

5.

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88 (1961).
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the positivist, confronted with the nightmarish possibility that the public will confuse legally valid rules with rules that ought to be obeyed,
sticks to his positivist thesis and sets out to change the public.
II.
The positivist nevertheless may rejoin that the content test is
hopelessly impractical, and that therefore the pedigree test should be
the only test for legal validity. If Professor MacCormick makes this
argument, he makes it implicitly in his insistance upon a practical solution to the problem of law and morality. He perhaps would have been
better off had he made this argument directly instead of attempting to
refute naturalism by an argument that we have seen is internally inconsistent. But apart from these tactical points, it seems fair to me that
the naturalist should discharge the burden of proving the practicality
of the content test, for otherwise the reader is left with choosing between an inconsistent theory of positivism and an impractical theory
of naturalism.
Part of what seems to be impractical about the content test is
that it would be applied to every rule alleged to be a rule of law. Yet
obviously a citizen cannot pick and choose among all rules according to
his own feelings about morality, or else society would grind to a halt.
A citizen cannot refuse to pay taxes on the basis that progressive rates
are unjust, or refuse to obey the laws against theft on the ground that
he is hungry, for such self-serving reasons would threaten the efficacy
of the legal system as a whole. Rather, I think there are four practical
criteria we may employ in giving content to the content test, the first
three constituting approval of the overwhelming majority of laws:
(1) Morally neutral legislation passes the content test. Most laws,
rules, and regulations, which are addressed to facilitating the interactions among citizens and the interface between citizens and government, are of this type.
(2) All morally supportive legislation passes the content test. This
includes nearly all the criminal law, the family law, and the law of torts.
(Even the thief, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau once pointed out, is in favor
of the laws against theft, for as soon as he steals something, he wants
to own and keep it as against everyone else.)
(3) Laws we disapprove of generally pass the content test as well.
Here we have to acknowledge the "macro-justice" concept of John Rawls
and other philosophers, to the effect that in most societies there will
be laws that are unfair to particular persons or groups, and yet overall
the unfairnesses tend to be cancelled out. A rich person may complain
about progressive income tax rates, and yet there is usually a sales tax
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol20/iss1/2
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in the same jurisdiction that is regressive. Blacks who in past decades
suffered from de facto segregation may today benefit from affirmative
action programs. If a society is in general a just society, individual laws
that are morally unjustified nevertheless pass the "content test" because, if they did not, the disruption that would occur resulting from
auto-invalidation by others would endanger more that is of value to the
individual than she could possibly gain by asserting that the particular
law she disagreed with was not legally valid.
(4) In rare instances, however, a statute or judicial precedent can
be so egregiously immoral that it fails the content test and should be
stripped of the term "law." One way of conceptualizing when this situation occurs is to speculate that denying the label "law" to such statutes or precedents would actually be a conservative strategy in
preserving the rest of the legal system. For example, the Supreme
Court's Dred Scott decision' was systemically intolerable and had to be
"reversed" by a bloody civil war. Or suppose the Supreme Court had
held in Brown v. Board of Education7 that schools could be segregated
because blacks were inferior to whites; such a decision would clearly
have been morally repugnant. It would have been publicly proclaimed
illegal even though it was asserted by the Supreme Court itself. In
Nazi Germany, a more naturalistic attitude on the part of the public
might have helped to label as illegal the Nuremberg legislation that
called for the sterilization of Jews and gypsies. In fact, as we know too
well, a pervasive positivist mentality was instrumental in securing the
acceptance of such legislation as legally valid and deserving of compliance just as any other rule of "law."
But even if my categories are accepted and it is conceded that
very few rules will ever be invalidated under the stringent fourth category test, it is nevertheless open to Professor MacCormick to object
to the fourth category itself as still being too elusive. He says that "It
is in fact a weakness of natural law proposals to incorporate an element
of moral substance into the formal definition of valid law that there can
be and is so broad and diverse a range of moral opinions and convictions."8 And he gives as an example of this diversity the Nazi claims
that their legislation was "done in the name of moral duty and racial
purity and such like supposed moral values."9 Whenever I see statements such as this, I wonder whether the speaker is talking out of any
sense of personal conviction or whether he is simply attempting to score

6.
7.
8.

Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
MacCormick, supra note 3, at 29.

9. Id.
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an academic point. Can Professor MacCormick really believe that the
Nazi practices constitute an example of a diverse range of moral opinions and convictions? The very sentence I quoted seems to belie the
point; he refers to "such like supposed moral values," a phrase which
I take it he would not use if he thought they were really moral values.
More significantly, Professor MacCormick earlier uses the phrase "justified rules" in several places, 10 as if everyone knows that there is a
core content to the term "justified." Presumably he would not count
the rack and screw as a justifiable procedure for determining the veracity of witnesses in a courtroom, and hence he must agree to a core
absolute standard for the term "justified." I would argue he subconsciously does so as well for the term "morality." He cannot really believe
that the Nazi legislation and practices were "moral," and he cannot
really believe that the Nazi leaders were justified in their opinions that
those practices were moral. True, the Nazis could claim that what they
did was moral, but what counts is whether we believe them. Otherwise,
the alternative is moral relativism.
But moral relativism is an incoherent doctrine, because it denies
meaning to the term "moral." Nothing at all is moral if it is moral for
people to do the opposite. In order for us to condemn murder, or rape,
or child abuse, we have to condemn them in all societies at all times
and in all places. We cannot accept a society which holds that child
abuse is moral;" we would have to label such a society as morally
barbarous or savage. Of course we should be careful, as I have argued
elsewhere,' 2 not to use the term "moral" too broadly or else we will in
fact include exotic practices that we really tolerate; I argued for calling
those practices "mores" and not "morals." Where Professor MacCormick calls for diversity and toleration, where he says that "different
opinions issue in different lifestyles and ways of life but ...the right
to dislike or be disgusted with some of these does not carry over into
a right to repress them simply on account of their being morally unsound or morally mistaken,"' 3 he is actually talking not about morality
but about mores. A different lifestyle is not in the same category as
rape or child abuse. Admittedly this point is not self-evident when first
encountered, but because I have spelled it out at length elsewhere, I
can only suggest here that Professor MacCormick's loose use of the
10. Id. at 22-30, esp. 28.
11. Note the dilemma of Colin Turnbull who attempted to report, as an objective
anthropologist, on the lk society in Africa, which practiced child abuse, in C.M. TURNBULL,
THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE (1972).
12. See D'Amato, Lon Fuller and Substantive NaturalLaw, 26 AM. J. JURIS. 202,
206-10 (1981).
13. MacCormick, supra note 3, at 14.
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term "morality" becomes irrelevant to his defense of positivism. Positivism and naturalism can differ as to the attitude law should take
regarding genuine matters of morality, but they both have nothing
intrinsically to do with the entirely different question of toleration of
4
diverse social mores and lifestyles.'
It is only when Professor MacCormick takes up geniune questions
of morality that the interesting question which he raises comes into
play: whether positivism can be linked to effecutuating that morality.
It is to this final question that I now turn.
III.
Professor MacCormick's central thesis may, I believe, be summarized as follows. "Sovereignty of conscience" is a moral principle,
not something simply left over when substantive moral requirements
are satisified. Sovereignty of conscience ought to be implemented in
any society for three or perhaps four fundamental reasons. First, there
is not much moral point (according to Professor MacCormick) in coercing people to do things; morality attains its highest goals when it is
rationally self-directed. (Thus, legally coercing a person to rescue a
drowning stranger negates the possibility of moral altruism by substi5
tuting for the altruistic motive the fear of incurring a legal penalty.)'
Second, recognizing a sphere of autonomy of conscience goes a long
way toward illegitimizing certain inroads the state might make into
personal privacy, such as "the criminalization of homosexual relationships, or extra-marital heterosexual ones, or the imposition of religious
tests or required religious observances."'" (In this aspect of the matter
there is a strong dose, maybe an overwhelming one, of Mill's On Liberty.)
Third, the autonomy of conscience means not conceding to the state
or the majority a monopoly of moral wisdom. (This is an aspect of a more
general rule, to which I would subscribe, that one should never delegate
to anyone else finality of moral judgment.) Finally, respect for law

14. As Hart has shown, there is no necessary connection between legal positivism and moral relativism. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 624-29 (1958). Professor MacCormick's apparent readiness to embrace moral relativism is not necessary for his defense of legal positivism.
15. Suppose a person is sitting on a dock watching another person drown in the
waters below. He can save the drowning person by kicking over a coil of rope on the
dock. What is more important-requiring him to do so, or preserving his sovereignty
of conscience by allowing him to continue to do nothing? I have suggested that moral
considerations require affirmative action, and to effectuate such action criminal legislation is desirable (I argued against liability in tort). See A. D'AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A
DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW 294-302 (1984).
16. MacCormick, supra note 3, at 12.
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may be enhanced if sovereignty of conscience is part of the positivist
legal program. In this way, there may be after all a sense of obligation
that can be imparted to rules that are merely legally valid in the positivist sense - if those rules are part of a legal system that has established sovereignty of conscience and disestablished those substantive
moral rules of the type condemned by John Stuart Mill. In that event,
Professor MacCormick's conclusion appears prima facie supportable:
that "laws satisfying the positivist definition do have some minimal
(and readily overridable) moral value."' 7
If my summary of his thesis is accurate, I would suggest that
Professor MacCormick's views have a nineteenth century flavor that
ignores many of the hard questions of moral philosophy that have been
raised since then. It was one thing for John Stuart Mill to argue for
individual liberty and autonomy at a time when moralist busybodies
such as John Erskine were getting the state involved in all kinds of interferences with the privacy of persons. But today that is not the burning issue. We now see that behind the shield of sovereignty of conscience
lie atrocities that were somehow beyond the notice of philosophers such
as Bentham and Mill. Consider the plight of battered wives, who in the
nineteenth and much of the twentieth century were denied standing in
court to complain against spousal brutality. Even more centrally, consider the recent revelations of widespread child abuse now surfacing
in congressional hearings in the United States. Child abuse is not new
to this century, but it was up to now ignored by the rational autonomous
adult world. The term "child abuse" does not begin to convey the real
horror only now being exposed: children who have been raped, tortured,
chained and blindfolded, severely beaten and often murdered, by parents who have treated them as chattels and nuisances. Many cases of
adult schizophrenia, for example, have now been traced to the invention
of new personalities to cope with the unending physical and sexual
abuse that was their lot as children. Yet Bentham and Mill talk almost
exclusively about freedom for adults. It is this freedom, this autonomy,
this "Keep Out" sign on the front door, that has protected many parents
in their unrestrained brutalization of their own children.
Clearly it is not enough now, and it has never been enough, to
rely on parents' "conscience" to protect their children; neither has conscience sufficed to protect wives from battering by their husbands. Of
course, Professor MacCormick might respond that he includes wives
and children among those persons entitled to moral autonomy, and
hence the state ought to protect their autonomy by preventing the

17.

Id. at 39.
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battering and abuse that I have described. But that does not solve the
philosophical problem, for what about fetuses? And if fetuses are entitled to potential autonomy because they are potential persons (and
Professor MacCormick candidly acknowledges the problem of abortion
as hard to deal with in terms of his own theory), what about animal
rights? Should the state interfere if a sports hunter, augmenting his
natural autonomy, slaughters large mammals in the wild for the sole
purpose of bringing their heads back to be stuffed as trophies? The
fact that many people's "conscience" might deter them from such sports
hunting does not deter those hunters without scruples, and if we care
at all about the animals (or even the preservation of their species) we
have no choice but to interfere with the hunters' autonomy and to
deprive them of the sovereignty of their own conscience.
I do not want to get sidetracked into substantive moral issues,
though I believe that without specificity of some kind these discussions
can become hopelessly vague and ambiguous. What I want to conclude
from the limited observations I have made is the strong assertion that
sovereignty of conscience as a moral principal is incoherent. If we really
believe something is morally required, we cannot simultaneously believe in sovereignty of conscience. We cannot sit back and allow parents
to torture and rape their children in the name of moral autonomy. While
I agree that it is desirable that people arrive at their own moral conclusions by the free exercise of their own rational thought, that desideratum is a luxury compared to the need to prevent real harms. (And
my animal-rights example greatly extends the concept of "harms" to
non-persons.)
I certainly share with Professor MacCormick, as both of us do
with John Stuart Mill, strong opposition to the legal institution of victimless crimes including interferences in the private sexual practices
of consenting adults. But are these moral-busybody examples really the
negation of "sovereignty of conscience," or are the two concepts only
historically and not logically in mutual opposition? It would appear that
the terms "sovereignty of conscience" and "moral autonomy of persons," and their cognates, are content-free, and hence cannot be associated necessarily with the practice of non-interference in personal
privacy. Another way to look at this matter is to examine the notion
of privacy itself. In the nineteenth century, privacy might connote freedom from state interference in matters of personal "vice," but it also
meant freedom for the family and for the husband-wife relationship.
Today, we can look at the latter "freedoms" as licences for brutality
to wives and children; and maybe in the twenty-first century the idea
of animal rights will also subtract from "privacy" any right to mistreat
sentient animals. We must conclude, therefore, that sovereignty of conProduced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
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science, autonomy, and privacy, are linked not logically but only historically (and at that, only in Anglo-American history) with the sorts
of freedoms John Stuart Mill was concerned with preserving.
I want to suggest now that exactly the same historical but not
logical connection obtains between legal positivism and the Millian freedoms. I know it is difficult for many people schooled or steeped in
Benthamite-Millian liberalism to distance themselves from such an historical coincidence. But surely there cannot be a logical connection
between the theory of legal positivism and the sort of substantive moral
legislation (in favor of the "sovereignty of conscience") that Professor
MacCormick purports to discover in his lectures. We need only remind
ourselves of Professor Von Hippel's point, cited by Fuller, that the
grossest violations of conscience occurred in positivist Nazi Germany
when people were legally coerced to do acts that have meaning only
when done voluntarily, such as the putting out of flags and saying "Heil
Hilter." 8 It is hard to find a natural-law example of anything quite so
perverse or quite so inimical to Professor MacCormick's sovereignty
of individual conscience.
True, legal positivism of the extremely right-wing Kelsen variety
has taken hold in many law schools in Latin America for the reason, I
am told, that it seems to help dissolve the pervasive power of the
Catholic Church in national legal systems. Perhaps today in Latin
America, as was true for Bentham in nineteenth century England, the
aura of scientism and objectivity associated with legal positivist theory
has the psychological effect of challenging an entrenched establishmentarian legal-moral system. But the converse can be true, depending
upon one's time and place. Natural-law theory, as I have already suggested, might have been a potential dissolver of the excesses of Nazism.
And today, in South Africa, a natural-law approach might serve the
interests of all the people far better than the official white supremecist
theory of legal positivism that so obviously pervades the South African
legal system and its supporters.
Where, then, are we left at the end of Professor MacCormick's
argument? I think there has been an advance, and that advance consists
of the recognition by Professor MacCormick, a positivist, that positivism needs to be justified morally (and not just as an apparent scientific
and objective fact about legal systems). But the justification that is
required cannot consist in labelling "sovereignty of conscience" as a

18. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 672 (1958), citing VON HIPPEL, DIE NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE HERRSCHAFTSORDNUNG ALS WAR NUNG UND LEHRE 6-7 (1946).
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moral principal, nor in compounding the confusion by claiming that
positivism minimally and hence necessarily promotes sovereignty of
conscience. We need, from the positivists, a more logical and coherent
argument than that. Until one comes along, I continue to believe that
positivists inherently have a difficult time in dealing with moral questions once they begin by insisting that law and morality are and ought
to be separate from each other.
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